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Abstract—Spiking neural network (SNN) is broadly deployed
in neuromorphic devices to emulate the brain function. In this
context, SNN security becomes important while lacking in-depth
investigation, unlike the hot wave in deep learning. To this
end, we target the adversarial attack against SNNs and identify
several challenges distinct from the ANN attack: i) current
adversarial attack is based on gradient information that presents
in a spatio-temporal pattern in SNNs, hard to obtain with
conventional learning algorithms; ii) the continuous gradient of
the input is incompatible with the binary spiking input during
gradient accumulation, hindering the generation of spike-based
adversarial examples; iii) the input gradient can be all-zeros (i.e.
vanishing) sometimes due to the zero-dominant derivative of the
firing function, prone to interrupt the example update.
Recently, backpropagation through time (BPTT)-inspired
learning algorithms are widely introduced into SNNs to improve
the performance, which brings the possibility to attack the models
accurately given spatio-temporal gradient maps. We propose two
approaches to address the above challenges of gradient-input
incompatibility and gradient vanishing. Specifically, we design a
gradient-to-spike (G2S) converter to convert continuous gradients
to ternary ones compatible with spike inputs. Then, we design
a gradient trigger (GT) to construct ternary gradients that can
randomly flip the spike inputs with a controllable turnover rate,
when meeting all-zero gradients. Putting these methods together,
we build an adversarial attack methodology for SNNs trained
by supervised algorithms. Moreover, we analyze the influence
of the training loss function and the firing threshold of the
penultimate layer, which indicates a “trap” region under the
cross-entropy loss that can be escaped by threshold tuning.
Extensive experiments are conducted to validate the effectiveness
of our solution, showing 99%+ attack success rate on most
benchmarks, which is the best result in SNN attack. Besides the
quantitative analysis of the influence factors, we evidence that
SNNs are more robust against adversarial attack than ANNs.
This work can help reveal what happens in SNN attack and
might stimulate more research on the security of SNN models
and neuromorphic devices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Spiking neural networks (SNNs) [1] closely mimic the
behaviors of neural circuits via spatio-temporal neuronal dy-
namics and event-drive activities (1-spike or 0-nothing). They
have shown promising ability in processing dynamic and noisy
information with high efficiency [2], [3] and have been applied
in a broad spectrum of tasks such as optical flow estimation
[4], spike pattern recognition [5], SLAM [6], probabilistic in-
ference [3], heuristically solving NP-hard problem [7], quickly
solving optimization problem [8], sparse representation [9],
robotics [10], and so forth. Besides the algorithm research,
SNNs are widely deployed in neuromorphic devices for low-
power brain-inspired computing [8], [11]–[13].
With more attention on SNNs from both academia and
industry, the security problem becomes quite important. Here
we focus on adversarial attack [14], one of the most popular
threat models for neural network security. In adversarial attack,
the attacker introduces imperceptible malicious perturbation
into the input data, i.e. generating adversarial examples, to
manipulate the model to cross the decision boundary thus
misleading the classification result. Usually, there are two
categories of approach to realize adversarial attack: content-
based and gradient-based. The former directly modifies the
semantic information (e.g. brightness, rotation, etc.) of inputs
or injects predefined Trojan into inputs [15]–[18]; while the
latter modifies inputs according to the input gradient under
specified labels [19]–[23]. The gradient-based adversarial at-
tack is able to achieve a better attack effectiveness, which is
the focus of this work.
Although adversarial attack is a very hot topic in artificial
neural networks (ANNs), it is rarely studied in the SNN
domain. We identify several challenges in attacking an SNN
model using adversarial examples. First, the gradient infor-
mation in SNNs presents as a spatio-temporal pattern that is
hard to obtain with traditional learning algorithms like the
gradient-free unsupervised learning [24] and spatial-gradient-
only ANN-to-SNN-conversion learning [25]. Second, the gra-
dients are continuous values, incompatible with the binary
spiking inputs. This data format incompatibility impedes the
generation of spike-based adversarial examples via gradient
accumulation. At last, there is severe gradient vanishing when
the gradient crosses the step firing function with a zero-
dominant derivative, which will interrupt the update of adver-
sarial examples. In fact, there are several prior studies on SNN
attack using trial-and-error input perturbation or transferring
the techniques proposed for ANN attack. Specifically, the
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2input can be perturbed in a trial-and-error manner by simply
monitoring the output change without calculating the gradient
[26], [27]; the adversarial examples generated by the substitute
ANN counterpart can be inherited to attack the SNN model
[28]. However, they just circumvent rather than directly solve
the SNN attack problem, which leads to some drawbacks that
will eventually lower down the attack effectiveness. For exam-
ple, the trial-and-error input perturbation method faces a large
search space without the guidance of supervised gradients;
the SNN/ANN model conversion method needs extra model
transformation and ignores the gradient information in the
temporal dimension.
Recently, the backpropagation through time (BPTT)-
inspired supervised learning algorithms [2], [5], [29]–[32] are
widely introduced into SNNs for performance boost, which
enables the direct acquisition of gradient information in both
spatial and temporal dimensions, i.e. spatio-temporal gradient
map. This brings opportunity to realize an accurate SNN attack
based on supervised gradients directly calculated in SNNs
without model conversion. Then, to address the mentioned is-
sues of gradient-input incompatibility and gradient vanishing,
we propose two approaches. We design a gradient-to-spike
(G2S) converter to convert continuous gradients to ternary
ones that are compatible with spike inputs. G2S exploits smart
techniques including probabilistic sampling, sign extraction,
and overflow-aware transformation, which can simultaneously
maintain the spike format and control the perturbation mag-
nitude. Then we design a gradient trigger (GT) to construct
ternary gradients that can randomly flip the spike inputs when
facing all-zero gradient maps, where the turnover rate of
inputs is controllable. Under this attack methodology for both
untargeted and targeted attacks, we analyze the impact of
two important factors on the attack effectiveness: the format
of training loss function and the firing threshold. We find a
“trap” region for the model trained by cross-entropy (CE)
loss, which makes it harder to attack when compared to the
one trained by mean square error (MSE) loss. Fortunately, the
“trap” region can be escaped by adjusting the firing threshold
of the penultimate layer. We extensively validate our SNN
attack methodology on both neuromorphic datasets (e.g. N-
MNIST [33] and CIFAR10-DVS [34]) and image datasets (e.g.
MNIST [35] and CIFAR10 [36]), and achieve superior attack
results. We summarize our contributions as below:
• We identify the challenges of adversarial attack against
SNN models, which are quite different from the ANN
attack. Then, we realize accurate SNN attack for the
first time via spike-compatible gradient. This work can
help reveal what happens in attacking SNNs and might
stimulate more research on the security of SNN models
and neuromorphic devices.
• We design a gradient-to-spike (G2S) converter to address
the gradient-input incompatibility problem and a gradient
trigger (GT) to address the gradient vanishing problem,
which form a gradient-based adversarial attack methodol-
ogy against SNNs trained by supervised algorithms. The
perturbation magnitude is well controlled in our design.
• We explore the influence of the training loss function and
the firing threshold of the penultimate layer, and propose
threshold tuning to improve the attack effectiveness.
• Extensive experiments are conducted on both neuromor-
phic and image datasets, where our methodology shows
99%+ attack success rate in most cases, which is the
best result on SNN attack. Besides, we demonstrate the
higher robustness of SNNs against adversarial attack
when compared with ANNs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides some preliminaries of SNNs and adversarial attack;
Section III discusses the challenges in SNN attack and our
differences with prior work; Section IV and Section V il-
lustrate our attack methodology and the two factors that can
affect the attack effectiveness; The experimental setup and the
result analyses are shown in Section VI; Finally, Section VII
concludes and discusses the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Spiking Neural Networks
Inspired by the biological neural circuits, SNN is designed
to mimic their behaviors. A spiking neuron is the basic
structural unit, as shown in Figure 1, which is comprised of
dendrite, soma and axon; many spiking neurons connected
by weighted synapses form an SNN, in which the binary
spike events carry information for inter-neuron communica-
tion. Dendrite integrates the weighted pre-synaptic inputs,
and soma consequently updates the membrane potential and
determines whether to fire a spike or not. When the membrane
potential crosses a threshold, a spike will be fired and sent to
post-neurons through axon.
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Figure 1: Introduction of SNNs: (a) neuronal components; (b)
computing model.
The leaky integrate-and-fire (LIF) model [37] is the most
widely adopted SNN model. The behavior of each LIF neuron
can be briefly expressed as
τ du(t)dt = −u(t) +
∑
j wjoj(t){
o(t) = 1 & u(t) = u0, if u(t) ≥ uth
o(t) = 0, if u(t) < uth
(1)
where t denotes the time step, τ is a time constant, and u
and o represent the membrane potential and resulting output
spike, respectively. wj is the synaptic weight between the j-th
3pre-neuron and the current neuron, and oj is the output spike
of the j-th pre-neuron (also as the input spike of the current
neuron). uth is the mentioned firing threshold and u0 is the
reset potential used after firing a spike.
The network structure of feedforward SNNs can be similar
with that of ANNs, including convolutional (Conv) layer, pool-
ing layer, and fully-connected (FC) layer. The network inputs
can be spike events captured by dynamic vision sensors [38]
(i.e. neuromorphic datasets) or converted from normal image
datasets through Bernoulli sampling [2]. The classification is
conducted based on the spikes of the output layer.
B. Gradient-based Adversarial Attack
We take the gradient-based adversarial attack in ANNs as
an illustrative example. The neural network is actually a map
from inputs to outputs, i.e. y = f(x), where x and y denote
inputs and outputs, respectively, and f : Rm → Rn is the map
function. Usually, the inputs are static images in convolutional
neural networks (CNNs). In adversarial attack, the attacker
attempts to manipulate the victim model to produce incorrect
outputs by adding imperceptible perturbations δ in the input
images. We define x′ = x+ δ as an adversarial example. The
perturbation is constrained by ‖δ‖p = ‖x′ − x‖p ≤ , where
‖·‖p denotes the p-norm and  reflects the maximum tolerable
perturbation.
Generally, the adversarial attack can be categorized into
untargeted attack and targeted attack according to the different
attack goals. Untargeted attack fools the model to classify the
adversarial example into any other class except for the original
correct one, which can be illustrated as f(x + δ) 6= f(x).
In contrast, for targeted attack, the adversarial example must
be classified in to a specified class, i.e. f(x + δ) = ytarget.
With these preliminary knowledge, the adversarial attack can
be formulated as an optimization problem as below to search
the smallest perturbation:
arg min
δ
‖δ‖p, s.t. f(x+ δ) 6= f(x), if untargeted
arg min
δ
‖δ‖p, s.t. f(x+ δ) = ytarget, if targeted
.
(2)
There are several widely-adopted adversarial attack algo-
rithms to find an approximated solution of the above opti-
mization problem. Here we introduce two of them: the fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) [19] and the basic iterative
method (BIM) [20].
FGSM. The main idea of FGSM is to generate the adversarial
examples based on the gradient information of the input.
Specifically, it calculates the gradient map of an input image,
and then adds or subtracts the sign of this input gradient map
in the original image with multiplying a small scaling factor.
The generation of adversarial examples can be formulated as{
x′ = x+ η · sign(OxL(θ, x, yorginal)), if untargeted
x′ = x− η · sign(OxL(θ, x, ytarget)), if targeted
(3)
where L and θ denote the loss function and parameters of
the victim model. η is used to control the magnitude of the
perturbation, which is usually small. In untargeted attack,
the adversarial example will drive the output away from the
original correct class, which results from the gradient ascent-
based input modification; while in targeted attack, the output
under the adversarial example goes towards the targeted class,
owing to the gradient descent-based input modification.
BIM. BIM algorithm is actually the iterative version of the
above FGSM, which updates the adversarial examples in an
iterative manner until the attack succeeds. The generation of
adversarial examples in BIM is governed by{
x′k+1 = x
′
k + η · sign(Ox′kL(θ, x′k, yorginal)), if untargeted
x′k+1 = x
′
k − η · sign(Ox′kL(θ, x′k, ytarget)), if targeted
(4)
where i is the iteration index. Specifically, x′k equals the
original input when k = 0, i.e. x′0.
III. CHALLENGES IN SNN ATTACK
Figure 2(a) briefly illustrates the work flow of adversarial
attack. There are three stages: forward pass to obtain the model
prediction, backward pass to calculate the input gradient, and
input update to generate the adversarial example. This flow
is straightforward to implement in ANNs, as shown in Figure
2(b), which is very similar to the ANN training. The only
difference lies in the input update that replaces the parameter
update in a normal ANN training. However, the case becomes
complicated in the SNN scenario, where the processing is
based on binary spikes with temporal dynamics rather than
continuous activations with immediate response. According to
Figure 2(c), we attempt to identify the challenges in SNN
attack to distinguish from the ANN attack and compare our
solution with prior studies in the following subsections.
A. Challenges and Solutions
Acquiring Spatio-temporal Gradients. In feedforward
ANNs, both the activations and gradients involve only the
spatial dimension without temporal components. For each
feature map, its gradient during the backward propagation
is still in a 2D shape. Whereas, each gradient map becomes
3D in SNNs due to the additional temporal dimension. It is
difficult to acquire the spatio-temporal gradients with tradi-
tional SNN learning algorithms. For example, the unsuper-
vised learning rules such as spike timing dependent plasticity
(STDP) [24] update synapses according to the activities of
local neurons without calculating the supervised gradients;
the ANN-to-SNN-conversion learning methods [25] simply
convert an SNN learning problem to an ANN one, leading
to the incapability in capturing temporal gradients. Recently,
the backpropagation through time (BPTT)-inspired learning
algorithm [2], [5], [29]–[32] is broadly studied to improve
the accuracy of SNNs. This emerging supervised learning
promises accurate SNN attack via the direct acquisition of
gradients in both spatial and temporal dimensions, which is
adopted by this work.
Incompatible Format between Gradients and Inputs. The
input gradients are in continuous values, while the SNN inputs
are in binary spikes (see the left of Figure 2(c), each point
represents a spike event, i.e. “1”; otherwise it is “0”). This
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Figure 2: Illustration of gradient-based adversarial attack: (a) overall flow including forward pass, backward pass, and input
update; (b) adversarial attack in ANNs; (c) adversarial attack in SNNs and its challenges.
data format incompatibility impedes the generation of spike-
based adversarial examples if we consider the conventional
gradient accumulation. In this work, we propose a gradient-to-
spike (G2S) converter to convert continuous gradients to spike-
compatible ternary gradients. This design exploits probabilistic
sampling, sign extraction, and overflow-aware transformation,
which can simultaneously maintain the spike format and
control the perturbation magnitude.
Gradient Vanishing Problem. The thresholded spike firing
of the LIF neuron, as mentioned in Equation (1), is actually a
step function that is non-differentiable. To address this issue, a
Dirac-like function is introduced to approximate the derivative
of the firing activity [29]. However, this approximation brings
abundant zero gradients outside the gradient window (to be
shown latter), leading to severe gradient vanishing during
backpropagation. We find that the input gradient map can be
all-zero sometimes, which interrupts the gradient-based update
of adversarial examples. To this end, we propose a gradient
trigger (GT) to construct ternary gradients that can randomly
flip the binary inputs in the case of all-zero gradients. We use
a baseline sampling factor to bound the overall turnover rate,
making the perturbation magnitude controllable.
B. Comparison with Prior Work on SNN Attack
The study on SNN attack is rarely seen, which is still in its
infant stage. We only find several related works talking about
this topic. In this subsection, we summarize their approaches
and clarify our differences compared with them.
Trial-and-Error Input Perturbation. Such attack algorithms
perturb inputs in a trial-and-error manner by monitoring the
variation of outputs. For example, A. Marchisio et al. [26]
modify the original image inputs before spike sampling. They
first select a block of pixels in the images, and then add a pos-
itive or negative unit perturbation onto each pixel. During this
process, they always monitor the output change to determine
the perturbation until the attack succeeds or the perturbation
exceeds a threshold. However, this image-based perturbation is
not suitable for the data sources with only spike events [33],
[34]. In contrast, A. Bagheri et al. [27] directly perturb the
spiking inputs rather than the original image inputs. The main
idea is to flip the input spikes and also monitor the outputs.
SNN/ANN Model Conversion. S. Sharmin et al. [28] convert
the SNN attack problem to an ANN one. They first build an
ANN substitute model that has the same network structure and
parameters copied from the trained SNN model. The gradient-
based adversarial attack is then conducted on the built ANN
counterpart to generate the adversarial examples.
These existing works suffer from several drawbacks that
would eventually degrade the attack effectiveness. Regarding
the trial-and-error input perturbation methods, the computa-
tional complexity is quite high due to the large search space
without the guidance of supervised gradients. Specifically,
each selected element of the inputs needs to run the for-
ward pass once (for spike perturbation) or twice (for image
perturbation) to monitor the outputs. The total computational
complexity is Iter × N × CFP , where Iter is the number
of attack iterations, N represents the size of search space,
and CFP is the computational cost of each forward pass.
This complexity is much higher than the normal one, i.e.
Iter×(CFP+CBP ), due to the large N . Because it is difficult
to find the optimal perturbation in such a huge space, the attack
effectiveness cannot be satisfactory given a limited search
time in reality. Regarding the SNN/ANN model conversion
method, an extra model transformation is needed and the
temporal information is aggregated during the SNN-to-ANN
conversion. Using a distinct model as the substitute model
and the missing of temporal components will compromise the
attack effectiveness in the end. Moreover, this method is not
applicable to the image-free spiking data sources without the
help of extra signal conversion.
Table I: Comparison with prior work on SNN attack.
Attack Data Spatio-temporal Computational Attack
Method Source Gradient Complexity Effectiveness
Trial-and-Error [26] Image % Iter ×N × 2CFP Low
Trial-and-Error [27] Spike % Iter ×N × CFP Low
Model Conversion [28] Image % Iter × (CFP + CBP ) Low
This Work Spike/Image ! Iter × (CFP + CBP ) High
5Compared with the above works that just circumvent the
SNN attack problem, we directly touch it and help reveal
what happens in attacking SNNs. We calculate the gradients
in both spatial and temporal dimensions without extra model
conversion, which matches the natural SNN behaviors. As a
result, the spatio-temporal input gradients can be acquired
in a supervised manner, laying a foundation for effective
attack. Then, the proposed G2S and GT enable the generation
of spiking adversarial examples based on the continuous
gradients even if when meeting the gradient vanishing. This
direct generation of spiking adversarial examples makes our
methodology suitable for the image-free spiking data sources.
For the SNN models using image-based data sources, our
solution is also applicable with a simple temporal aggregation
of spatio-temporal gradients. In summary, Table I shows the
differences between our work and prior work.
Please note that we focus on the white-box attack in this
paper. Specifically, under the white-box attack scenario, the
adversary knows the network structure and model parameters
(e.g. weights, uth, etc.) of the victim model. The reason of
this scenario selection lies in that the white-box attack is the
fundamental step to understand adversarial attack, which is
more appropriate for the first work to investigate the direct
adversarial attack against SNNs. Furthermore, the methodol-
ogy built for the white-box attack can be easily transferred to
the black-box attack in the future.
IV. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AGAINST SNNS
In this section, we first introduce the input data format
briefly, and then explain the flow, approach, and algorithm
of our attack methodology in detail.
Input Data Format. It is natural for an SNN model to
handle spiking signals. Therefore, considering the datasets
containing spike events, such as N-MNIST [33] and CIFAR10-
DVS [34], is the first choice. In this case, the input is originally
in a spatio-temporal pattern with a binary value for each
element (0-nothing; 1-spike). The attacker can flip the state of
selected elements, while the binary format must be maintained.
Due to the lack of spiking data sources in reality, the image
datasets are also widely used in the SNN field by converting
them into the spiking version [5], [39]. Bernoulli sampling [2]
is a common way to convert the pixel intensity to a spike train
(recalling the “Sample” in Figure 2), where the spike rate is
proportional to the intensity value. In this case, the attacker
can modify the intensity value of selected pixels by adding
the continuous perturbation. Figure 3 illustrates the adversarial
examples in these two cases.
A. Attack Flow Overview
The overview of the proposed adversarial attack against
SNNs is illustrated in Figure 4. The basic flow adopts the
BIM method given in Equation (4), which is the result after
considering the spiking inputs of SNNs. The perturbation for
spikes can only flip the binary states (0 or 1) of selected
input elements rather than add continuous values. Therefore, to
generate spiking adversarial examples that are able to cross the
decision boundary, the search of candidate elements is more
Image Input Spiking Input
Original
Input
Adversarial
Input
Classified as ‘3’ Classified as ‘8’
Aggregated Spiking 
Input
Figure 3: The data format of original inputs and adversarial
examples. The red and blue colors denote two spike channels
induced by dynamic vision sensors [33], [38].
important than the perturbation magnitude. FGSM cannot do
this since it only explores the perturbation magnitude, while
BIM realizes this by searching new candidate elements in
different iterations.
As aforementioned, there are three stages: forward pass
(FP), backward pass (BP), and input update, which is executed
iteratively until the attack succeeds. The gradients here are in
a spatio-temporal pattern, which matches the spatio-temporal
dynamics of SNNs and enables a higher attack effectiveness.
Besides, the incompatibility between continuous gradients and
binary inputs is addressed by the proposed gradient-to-spike
(G2S) converter; the gradient vanishing problem is solved by
the proposed gradient trigger (GT). Next, we describe the
specific flow for spiking inputs and image inputs individually
for a clear understanding.
Spiking Inputs. The blue arrows in Figure 4 illustrate this
case. The generation of spiking adversarial examples relies on
three steps as follows. In step 1©, the continuous gradients are
calculated in the FP and BP stages by{
δs′k = Oxs′kL(θ, xsk, yoriginal), if untargeted
δs′k = −Oxs′kL(θ, xsk, ytarget), if targeted
(5)
where δs′k represents the input gradient map at the k-th
iteration. Since all elements in δs′k are continuous values,
they cannot be directly accumulated onto the spiking inputs
(i.e. xsk) to avoid breaking the data format of binary spikes.
Therefore, in the step 2©, we propose G2S converter to convert
the continuous gradient map to a ternary one compatible with
the spike input, which can simultaneously maintain the input
data format and control the perturbation magnitude. When the
input gradient vanishes (i.e. all elements in δs′k are zero),
we propose GT to construct a ternary gradient map that can
randomly flip the input spikes with a controllable turnover
rate. At last, step 3© accumulates the ternary gradients onto
the spiking inputs.
Image Inputs. Sometimes, the benchmarking models convert
image datasets to spike inputs via Bernoulli sampling. In this
case, one more step is additionally needed to generate image-
style adversarial examples, which is shown in the red arrows
in Figure 4. After the above step 2©, the ternary gradient map
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Figure 4: Overview of the adversarial attack flow for SNNs with spiking inputs or image inputs.
should be aggregated in the temporal dimension, i.e. averaging
all elements belonging to the same spatial location but in
different time steps, according to δik = 1T
∑T
t=1 δs
t
k. After
this temporal aggregation, the image-compatible input pertur-
bation can be acquired. Note that in each update iteration, the
intensity value of xik will be clipped within [0, 1].
B. Acquisition of Spatio-Temporal Gradients
We introduce the state-of-the-art supervised learning algo-
rithms for SNNs [5], [29], [31], which are inspired by the
backpropagation through time (BPTT) to acquire the gradients
in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Here we take the
one in [5] as an illustrative example. In order to simulate in
current programming frameworks (e.g. Pytorch), the original
LIF neuron model in Equation (1) shoud be first converted to
its equivalent iterative version. Specifically, we have{
ut+1,n+1i = e
− dtτ ut,n+1i (1− ot,n+1i ) +
∑
j w
n
ijo
t+1,n
j
ot+1,n+1i = fire(u
t+1,n+1
i − uth)
(6)
where t and n represent indices of the simulation time step
and the layer, respectively, dt is the time step length, and e−
dt
τ
reflects the leakage effect of the membrane potential. fire(·)
is a step function, which satisfies fire(x) = 1 when x ≥ 0,
otherwise fire(x) = 0. This iterative LIF model incorporates
all behaviors of a spiking neuron, including integration, fire,
and reset.
Then, a loss function L is needed for the gradient descent-
based supervised learning. The spike rate coding is widely
used to convert the spatio-temporal spike pattern of the output
layer to a spike rate vector, described as
yi =
1
T
T∑
t=1
ot,Ni (7)
where N is the output layer index and T is the length of
the simulation time window. This spike rate vector can be
viewed as the normal output vector in ANNs. With this output
conversion, the typical loss functions for ANNs, such as mean
square error (MSE) and cross-entropy (CE), can also be used
as the loss function for SNNs.
Based on the iterative LIF neuron model and a given loss
function, the gradient propagation can be governed by
∂L
∂ot,ni
=
∑
j
∂L
∂ot,n+1j
∂ot,n+1j
∂ot,ni
+ ∂L
∂ot+1,ni
∂ot+1,ni
∂ot,ni
∂L
∂ut,ni
= ∂L
∂ot,ni
∂ot,ni
∂ut,ni
+ ∂L
∂ot+1,ni
∂ot+1,ni
∂ut,ni
. (8)
However, the firing function is non-differentiable, i.e. ∂o∂u
does not exist. As mentioned earlier, a Dirac-like function is
introduced to approximate its derivative [29]. Specifically, ∂o∂u
can be estimated by
∂o
∂u
≈
{
1
a , |u− uth| ≤ a2
0, otherwise
(9)
where a is a hyper-parameter to control the gradient width
when passing the firing function during backpropagation.
This approximation indicates that only the neurons whose
membrane potential is close to the firing threshold have the
chance to let gradients pass through, as shown in Figure 5.
It can be seen that abundant zero gradients are produced,
which might lead to the gradient vanishing problem (all input
gradients become zero).
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Figure 5: The distribution of input gradients overall 500
samples from N-MNIST. The model is trained with MSE loss.
C. Gradient-to-Spike (G2S) Converter
There are two goals in the design of G2S converter in each
iteration: (1) the final gradients should be compatible with
the spiking inputs, i.e. remaining the spike format unchanged
after the gradient accumulation; (2) the perturbation magnitude
should be imperceptible, i.e. limiting the number of non-zero
gradients. To this end, we design three steps: probabilistic
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Figure 6: Gradient-to-spike (G2S) converter with probabilistic
sampling, sign extraction, and overflow-aware transformation.
sampling, sign extraction, and overflow-aware transformation,
which are illustrated in Figure 6.
Probabilistic Sampling. The absolute value of the input
gradient map obtained by Equation (5), i.e. |δs′k|, is first
normalized to lie in the range of [0, 1]. Then, the normalized
gradient map, i.e. norm(|δs′k|), is sampled to produce a binary
mask with the same shape, in which the 1s indicate the
locations where gradients can pass through. The probabilistic
sampling for each gradient element obeys{
P (δmask = 1) = norm(|δs′k|)
P (δmask = 0) = 1− norm(|δs′k|)
. (10)
In other words, a larger gradient has a larger possibility to
let the gradient pass through. By multiplying the resulting
mask with the original gradient map, the number of non-
zero elements can be reduced significantly. To evidence this
conclusion, we run the attack against the SNN model with a
network structure to be provided in Table V over 500 spiking
inputs from N-MNIST, and the results are presented in Figure
7. Given MSE loss and untarget attack scenario, the number
of non-zero elements in δs′k could reach 2
10. After using the
probabilistic sampling, the number of non-zero elements in
δs′k  δmask can be greatly decreased, masking out > 96%
percentage.
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Figure 7: The number of elements with non-zero input gradi-
ents before and after the probabilistic sampling. We report the
average data across the inputs in each class.
Sign Extraction. Now, we explain how to generate a ternary
gradient map where each element is in {−1, 0, 1}, which can
maintain the spike format after accumulating onto the spiking
inputs with binary values of {0, 1}. This step is simply based
on a sign extraction:
δs′′k = sign(δs
′
k  δmask) (11)
where we define sign(x) = 1 if x > 0, sign(x) = 0 if x = 0,
and sign(x) = −1 otherwise.
Overflow-aware Transformation. Although the above δs′′k is
able to be ternary, it cannot ensure that the final adversarial
example generated by input gradient accumulation is still
limited in {0, 1}. For example, an original “0” element in
xsk with a “−1” gradient or an original “1” element with
a “1” gradient will yield a “−1” or “2” input that is out of
{0, 1}. This overflow breaks the data format of binary spikes.
To address this issue, we propose an overflow-aware gradient
transformation to constrain the range of the final adversarial
example, which is illustrated in Table II.
Table II: Overflow-aware gradient transformation.
Before Transformation After Transformation
xsk δs
′′
k xsk + δs
′′
k δsk xsk + δsk
0/1 0 0/1 0 0/1
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 0 1
0 -1 -1 0 0
1 -1 0 -1 0
After introducing the above three steps, now the function
of G2S converter can be briefly summarized as below:
δsk = transform[sign(δs
′
k  δmask), xsk] (12)
where transform(·) denotes the overflow-aware transforma-
tion. The G2S converter is able to achieve the two goals
mentioned earlier by simultaneously keeping the spike com-
patibility and controlling the perturbation magnitude.
D. Gradient Trigger (GT)
Table III identifies the gradient vanishing issue in SNNs
trained by BPTT, which is quite severe. The purpose of
designing GT is to solve the gradient vanishing problem
by constructing gradients artificially. The constraints of the
constructed gradient map are the same with those of G2S
converter, i.e. spike format compatibility and perturbation
magnitude controllability. To this end, we design two steps:
element selection and gradient construction, which is illus-
trated in Figure 8.
Table III: Number of inputs with all-zero gradients at the first
attack iteration. We test the untargeted attack with over 500
inputs for each dataset.
Dataset N-MNIST CIFAR10-DVS MNIST CIFAR10
#grad.-vanish. inputs (MSE) 130 41 436 103
#grad.-vanish. inputs (CE) 256 32 471 105
Element Selection. This step is to select the elements to let
gradients pass through. In G2S converter, the probabilistic
sampling is used to produce a binary mask to indicate the
element selection, whereas, all the gradients in δs′k are zeros
here. To continue the use of the above probabilistic sampling
method, we provide a gradient initialization that sets all
elements to γ as the example provided in Figure 8. γ is a
factor within the range of [0, 1], which controls the number
of non-zero gradients after GT. Now the probabilistic sampling
in Equation (10) is still applicable to generate the mask δmask.
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Figure 8: Gradient trigger (GT) with element selection and
gradient construction.
Table IV: Gradient construction to flip spiking inputs.
After Construction
xsk δmask δsk xsk + δsk
0/1 0 0 0/1
0 1 1 1
1 1 -1 0
Gradient Construction. To maintain the spike format of
adversarial examples, we just flip the state of spiking inputs
in the selected region. Here the flipping means switching the
element state to “0” if it is “1” currently, or vice versa. Table
IV illustrates the construction of ternary gradients that are able
to flip the spiking inputs.
With the above two steps, the spiking inputs can be flipped
randomly with a good control of the overall turnover rate. The
overall function of GT can be expressed as
δsk = construct(δmask, xsk). (13)
To summarize, GT continues the update of adversarial exam-
ples interrupted by the gradient vanishing.
E. Overall Attack Algorithm
Based on the explanations of G2S converter and GT, Al-
gorithm 1 provides the overall attack algorithm corresponding
to the attack flow illustrated in Figure 4. For different input
data formats, we give different ways to generate adversarial
examples. There are several hyper-parameters in our algorithm,
such as the maximum attack iteration number (Iter), the
norm format (p) for quantifying the perturbation magnitude
‖δ‖p, the perturbation magnitude upper bound (), the gradient
scaling rate (η), and the sampling factor (γ) in GT.
V. LOSS FUNCTION AND FIRING THRESHOLD
In this work, we consider two design knobs that affect the
SNN attack effectiveness: the loss function during training and
the firing threshold of the penultimate layer during attack.
A. MSE and CE Loss Functions
We compare two widely used loss functions, mean square
error (MSE) loss and cross entropy (CE) loss. The former
directly receives the fire rate of the output layer, while the latter
needs an extra softmax layer following the output fire rate. We
observe that the gradient vanishing occurs more often when
Input: x, Iter, p, , η, γ;
if image input then xi0 = x; end
else xs0 = x; end
for k = 1 to Iter do
if image input then
xsk ← Bernoulli sampling on xik;
end
Get δs′k through Equation (5);
if gradient vanishing occurs in δs′k then
// GT
δmask ← Probabilistic sampling on γ;
δsk = construct(δmask, xsk);
end
else
// G2S converter
δmask ← Probabilistic sampling on norm(|δs′k|);
δsk = transform[sign(δs
′
k  δmask), xsk];
end
if image input then
δik ← 1T
∑T
t=1 δs
t
k; // Temporal aggregation
if ‖δik‖p >  then
break; // Attack failed
end
else
xik+1 = xik + δik;
end
if attack succeeds then
return xik+1; // Attack successful
end
end
else
if ‖δsk‖p >  then
break; // Attack failed
end
else
xsk+1 = xsk + δsk;
end
if attack succeeds then
return xsk+1; // Attack successful
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: The overall SNN attack algorithm.
the model is trained by CE loss. It seems that there is a “trap”
region in this case, which means the output neurons cannot
change the response any more no matter how GT modifies the
input. We use Figure 9(a) to illustrate our finding. When we
use CE loss during training, the gradient is usually vanished
between the decision boundaries (i.e. the shaded area) and
cannot be recovered by GT; while this phenomenon seldom
happens if MSE loss is used.
For a deeper understanding, we examine the output pattern
of the penultimate layer (during untargeted attack) since it
directly interacts with the output layer, as depicted in Figure
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Figure 9: Loss function analysis: (a) decision boundary com-
parison; (b) the number of output spikes in the penultimate
layer. We report the average data across different inputs.
9(b). Here the network structure will be provided in Table
V and the 500 test inputs are randomly selected from the N-
MNIST dataset. When the training loss is MSE, the number of
output spikes in the penultimate layer gradually decreases as
the attack process evolves. On the contrary, the spike number
first increases and then stays unchanged for the CE trained
model. Based on this observation, one possible hypothesis is
that more output spikes in the penultimate layer might increase
the distance between decision boundaries, thus introducing the
mentioned “trap” region with gradient vanishing.
B. Firing Threshold of the Penultimate Layer
As introduced in the above subsection, the models trained
by CE loss are prone to output more spikes in the penultimate
layer, leading to the “trap” region that makes the attack
difficult. To address this issue, we increase the firing threshold
of the penultimate layer during attack to reduce the number of
spikes there. Specifically, we only modify the firing threshold
during the FP stage (see Figure 4). The results are shown in
Figure 10, where the CE loss is used and other settings are
the same with those in Figure 9(b). Compared to the original
threshold setting (uth = 0.3) in the previous experiments,
the number of output spikes in the penultimate layer can
be decreased significantly on average. Latter experiments in
Section VI-D will evidence that this tuning of firing threshold
is able to improve the adversarial attack effectiveness.
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Figure 10: The number of output spikes in the penultimate
layer with different firing threshold. We report the average
data across different inputs.
VI. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
A. Experiment Setup
We design our experiments on both spiking and image
datasets. The spiking datasets include N-MNIST [33] and
CIFAR10-DVS [34] which are captured by dynamic vision
sensors [38]; while the image datasets include MNIST [35]
and CIFAR10 [36]. For these two kinds of dataset, we use
different network structure, as listed in Table V. For each
dataset, the detailed hyper-parameter setting during training
and the trained accuracy are shown in Table VI. The default
loss function is MSE unless otherwise specified. Note that
since we focus on the attack methodology in this work, we
do not use the optimization techniques such as input encoding
layer, neuron normalization, and voting-based classification [5]
to improve the training accuracy.
Table V: Network structure on on different datasets. “C”, “AP”,
and “FC” denote convolution layer, average pooling layer, and
fully-connected layer, respectively.
Dataset Network Structure
Spike Input-128C3-128C3-AP2-384C3-384C3-AP2-1024FC-512FC-10FC
Image Input-128C3-256C3-AP2-512C3-AP2-1024C3-512C3-1024FC-512FC-10FC
Table VI: Hyper-parameter setting during training and the
trained accuracy.
Datasets N-MNIST CIFAR10-DVS MNIST CIFAR10
Input Size 34× 34× 2 40× 40× 2 28× 28× 1 32× 32× 3
uth 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
a 0.5 0.5 1 1
T 15 10 15 15
Accuracy (MSE) 99.49% 64.60% 99.27% 76.37%
Accuracy (CE) 99.42% 64.50% 99.52% 77.27%
We set the maximum iteration number of adversarial attack,
i.e. Iter in Algorithm 1, to 25. We randomly select 50 inputs
in each of the 10 classes for untargeted attack and 10 inputs in
each class for targeted attack. Note that only the inputs which
can be correctly recognized by the model will be selected
for attack. In targeted attack, we set the target to all classes
except the ground-truth one. We use attack success rate and
perturbation magnitude (i.e. ‖δ‖p) as two metrics to evaluate
the attack effectiveness. We set p = 1 and p = 2 in the
scenarios with spiking inputs and image inputs, respectively.
B. Influence of G2S Converter
We first validate the effectiveness of G2S converter. Among
the three steps in G2S converter (i.e. probabilistic sampling,
sign extraction, and overflow-aware transformation) as in-
troduced in Section IV-C, the last two are must needed in
addressing the spike compatibility while the first one is just
used to control the perturbation amplitude. Therefore, we
examine how does the probabilistic sampling in G2S converter
affects the attack effectiveness. Please note that we do not use
GT to solve the gradient vanishing in this subsection.
Figure 11 presents the comparison of attack results (e.g.
success/failure rate, gradient vanishing rate, and perturbation
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Figure 11: Impact of the probabilistic sampling in G2S con-
verter over different datasets. T-targeted attack, UT-untargeted
attack, w/oS-without sampling, wS-with sampling.
amplitude) over four datasets with or without the probabilistic
sampling. Both the untargeted attack and the targeted attack
are tested. We provide the following several observations.
First, the required perturbation amplitude of targeted attack
is higher than that of untargeted attack, and the success
rate of targeted attack is usually lower than that of untarget
attack. These results reflect the difficulty of targeted attack
that needs to move the output to an expected class accurately.
Second, the probabilistic sampling can significantly reduce
the perturbation amplitude in all cases because it removes
many small gradients. Third, the success rate (especially of
the more difficult targeted attack) can be improved to a great
extent on most datasets via the sampling optimization owing
to the improved attack convergence with smaller perturbation.
With the probabilistic sampling, the attack failure rate could
be reduced to almost zero if the gradient is not vanished.
C. Influence of GT
Then, we validate the effectiveness of GT. In GT, the hyper-
parameter γ controls the number of selected elements, thus
affecting the perturbation amplitude. Keep in mind that a larger
γ indicates a larger perturbation via flipping the state of more
elements in the spiking input.
We first analyze the impact of γ on the attack success
rate and perturbation amplitude, as shown in Figure 12. A
similar conclusion as observed in Section VI-B also holds,
that the target attack is more difficult than the untargeted
attack. As γ decreases, the number of elements with flipped
state is reduced, leading to smaller perturbation. Whereas, the
impact of γ on the attack success rate depends heavily on
the attack scenario and the dataset. For the easier untargeted
attack, it seems that a slightly smaller γ is already helpful.
The attack success rate will be saturated close to 100% even
if at γ = 0.01. For the targeted attack with higher difficulty,
it seems that there exists an obvious peak success rate on
these datasets where the γ value equals 0.05. The results are
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Figure 12: Impact of γ in GT on the attack success rate and
the perturbation amplitude. T-targeted attack, UT-untargeted
attack.
reasonable since the impact of γ is two-fold: i) a too large
γ will result in a large perturbation amplitude and a non-
convergent attack; ii) a too small γ cannot move the model
out of the region with gradient vanishing.
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Figure 13: Impact of γ in GT on the trigger times. T-targeted
attack, UT-untargeted attack.
We also record the number of trigger times under different
γ setting, as shown in Figure 13. Here the “trigger times”
means the number of iterations during the attack process where
the gradient vanishing occurs. We report the average value
across different input examples. When γ is large, the number
of trigger times can be only one since the perturbation is large
enough to push the model out of the gradient vanishing region.
As γ becomes smaller, the required number of trigger times is
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Figure 14: Impact of the firing threshold on the attack success rate. T-targeted attack, UT-untargeted attack.
larger. In order to balance the attack success rate (see Figure
12) and the trigger time (see Figure 13), we finally recommend
the setting of γ = 0.05 in GT on the datasets we tested. In
real-world applications, the ideal setting should be explored
again according to actual needs.
D. Influence of Loss Function and Firing Threshold
Additionally, we evaluate the influence of different training
loss function on the attack success rate. The comparison is
summarized in Table VII. Here the G2S converter and GT are
switched on. The model trained by CE loss leads to a lower
attack success rate compared to the one trained by MSE loss,
and the gap is especially large in the targeted attack scenario.
As explained in Section V, this reflects the “trap” region of
the models trained by CE loss due to the the increasing spike
activities in the penultimate layer during attack.
Table VII: Impact of the training loss function on the attack
success rate. Here the firing threshold is not optimized. T-
targeted attack, UT-untargeted attack.
MSE Loss CE Loss
Dataset UT T UT T
N-MNIST 97.38% 99.44% 90.12% 16.78%
CIFAR10-DVS 100% 86.35% 100% 82.95%
MNIST 91.31% 55.33% 93.16% 47.81%
CIFAR10 98.68% 99.72% 98.48% 40.51%
To improve the attack effectiveness, we increase the firing
threshold of the penultimate layer during attack to sparsify
the spiking activities. The experiment results are provided in
Figure 14. For untargeted attack, the increase of the firing
threshold can improve the attack success rate to almost 100%
on all datasets. For targeted attack, the cases present different
behaviors. Specifically, on image datasets (i.e. MNIST and
CIFAR10), the attack success rate can be quickly improved
and remained at about 100%; while on spiking datasets (i.e.
N-MNIST and CIFAR10-DVS), the attack success rate initially
goes higher and then decreases, in other words, there exists a
best threshold setting. This might be due to the sparse-event
nature of the neuromorphic datasets, on which the number of
spikes injected into the last layer will be decreased severely if
the firing threshold becomes large enough, leading to a fixed
loss value and thus a degraded attack success rate. Moreover,
from the perturbation distribution, it can be seen that the
increase of the firing threshold does not introduce additional
perturbation in most cases. All the above results indicate that
appropriately increasing the firing threshold of the penultimate
layer is able to improve the attack effectiveness significantly
without enlarging the perturbation.
E. Effectiveness Comparison with Existing SNN Attack
As discussed in Section III-B, our attack is quite different
from previous work using trial-and-error input perturbation
[26], [27] or SNN/ANN model conversion [28]. Beyond the
methodology difference, here we coarsely discuss the attack
effectiveness. Due to the high complexity of the trial-and-
error manner, the testing dataset is quite small (e.g. USPS
dataset [26]) or even with only one single example [27]. In
contrast, we demonstrate the effective adversarial attack on
much larger datasets including MNIST, CIFAR10, N-MNIST,
and CIFAR10-DVS. For the SNN/ANN model conversion
method [28], the authors show results on MNIST dataset.
Whereas, the highest untargeted and targeted attack success
rates are only about 75% and 65% (inferred from the figure in
[28]), respectively. In contrast, our attack success rate could
reach 99%+ in most cases. Although the highest targeted
attack success rate on N-MNIST with CE training loss is only
81.44% (see Figure 14(a)), it is reported for the first time.
Overall, our work provides the most testing datasets for SNN-
based adversarial attack and achieves the best effectiveness.
F. Effectiveness Comparison with ANN Attack
In this subsection, we further compare the attack effective-
ness between SNNs and ANNs on image-based datasets, i.e.
MNIST and CIFAR10. For ANN models, we use the same
network structure as SNN models given in Table V. The
training loss function is CE here. We test two attack scenarios:
independent attack and cross attack. For the independent
attack, the ANN models are attacked using the BIM method
in Equation (4); while the SNN models are attacked using the
12
proposed methodology. Note that the firing threshold of the
the penultimate layer of SNN models during attack is set to
2 in this subsection as suggested by Figure 14. For the cross
attack, we use the adversarial examples generated by attacking
the SNN models to mislead the ANN models, or vice versa.
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Figure 15: Comparison between ANNs and SNNs on the attack
effectiveness. T-targeted attack, UT-untargeted attack.
From Figure 15(a)-(b), we can easily observe that all attack
success rates are quite high in the independent attack scenario.
While, attacking the SNN models requires more perturbation
than attacking the ANN models, which reflects the higher
robustness of the SNN models. From the results of the cross
attack in Figure 15(c)-(d), we find that using the adversarial
examples generated by attacking ANN models to fool the SNN
models is very difficult, with only <12% success rate. This
further helps conclude that attacking an SNN model is harder
than attacking an ANN model with the same network structure.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
SNNs have attracted broad attention and have been widely
deployed in neuromorphic devices due to the importance for
brain-inspired computing. Naturally, the security problem of
SNNs should be considered. In this work, we select the
adversarial attack against the SNNs trained by BPTT-like
supervised learning as a starting point. First, we identify the
challenges in attacking an SNN model, i.e. the incompatibility
between the spiking inputs and the continuous gradients, and
the gradient vanishing problem. Second, we design a gradient-
to-spike (G2S) converter with probabilistic sampling, sign
extraction, and overflow-aware transformation, and a gradient
trigger (GT) with element selection and gradient construction
to address the mentioned two challenges, respectively. Our
methodology can control the perturbation amplitude well and
is applicable to both spiking and image data formats. Inter-
estingly, we find that there is a “trap” region in SNN models
trained by CE loss, which can be overcome by adjusting the
firing threshold of the penultimate layer. We conduct extensive
experiments on various datasets including MNIST, CIFAR10,
N-MNIST, and CIFAR10-DVS and show 99%+ attack success
rate in most cases, which is the best result on SNN attack. The
in-depth analysis on the influence of G2S converter, GT, loss
function, and firing threshold are also provided. Furthermore,
we compare the attack of SNNs and ANNs and reveal the
robustness of SNNs against adversarial attack. Our findings
are helpful to understand the SNN attack and can stimulate
more research on the security of neuromorphic computing.
For future work, we recommend several interesting topics.
Although we only study the white-box adversarial attack to
avoid shifting the focus of presenting our methodology, the
black-box adversarial attack should be investigated because it
is more practical. Fortunately, the proposed methods in this
work can be transferred into the black-box attack scenario.
Second, we only analyze the influence of loss function and
firing threshold due to the page limit. It still remains an
open question that whether other factors like the gradient
approximation form of the firing activities, the time window
length for rate coding or the coding scheme itself, and the
network structure can affect the attack effectiveness. Third,
the attack against physical neuromorphic devices rather than
just theoretical models is more attractive. At last, compared to
the attack methods, the defense techniques are highly expected
for the construction of large-scale neuromorphic systems.
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